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The expansion of service jobs within European coordinated economies has been accompanied by 
growing inequality in pay and working conditions.
1
 In the past, these economies were dominated by 
strong manufacturing unions that were able to distribute productivity gains to their members in core 
sectors, but also across workplaces with weaker collective bargaining institutions. As employment 
shifts to service industries characterized by low union density and volatile jobs, unions find it 
increasingly difficult to maintain encompassing bargaining arrangements. These developments are 
often connected to broader processes of economic globalization and European integration that are 
driving the liberalization of protective institutions and dualization between labor market insiders 
and outsiders.
2
  
 
A large body of research investigates the political dynamics through which coordinating institutions 
are undermined or sustained in different European political economies undergoing liberalization. 
Scholars associated with the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) tradition have argued that cross-national 
divergence is due to factors such as the role and size of the state,
3
 the degree of centralization in 
business associations,
4
 and the structure of electoral and party systems.
5
 These analyses concentrate 
overwhelmingly on the politics of coalition-building at the national level, with most studies 
reflecting the bias towards manufacturing typical of the VoC literature. Where service industry 
actors are included in these frameworks, they are typically either treated as peripheral groups or 
analyzed for their interactions with representatives of manufacturing employers or unions in peak 
associations.
6
  
 
In this paper, we present an alternative industry-based approach to studying the causes of divergent 
patterns of institutional change and their labor market effects. Institutional change has been argued 
to occur through processes of ‘drift’ or ‘conversion’ as actors re-interpret institutions.7 Much of this 
reinterpretation takes place within specific industry and workplace settings, where actors negotiate 
over pay and the distribution of productivity gains. By neglecting heterogeneous sectoral 
developments, theorists may overestimate institutional stability and the distributional effects of 
formal policy changes. Understanding the political dynamics of institutional change at the micro- or 
meso-levels within national political economies is necessary for developing broader theories 
concerning sources of institutional change from below, evaluating weaknesses or pressure points in 
national models, and identifying the power resources that key actors draw on to pursue their 
distinctive interests. 
 
We demonstrate the value of this approach by comparing trajectories of institutional change in 
national telecommunications industries, based on case studies in Austria, Denmark, Germany, and 
Sweden. Our analysis traces developments in sectoral and firm-level bargaining following market 
liberalization and the privatization of incumbent firms in the 1990s. Despite similarities in the 
challenges to established institutions, we observe different outcomes in the four countries. In 
Austria and Sweden, unions were able to maintain and extend encompassing collective bargaining 
institutions within the sector. In contrast, Germany and Denmark experienced decentralization and 
disorganization, resulting in growing inequality between industry segments as well as between and 
within incumbent firms. These trends were exacerbated by firms’ restructuring strategies that 
reduced pay and conditions for formerly core workers.  
 
This pattern of outcomes is surprising from the perspective of recent comparative research on 
political responses to liberalization, which would predict greater stability of solidaristic institutions 
in the macrocorporatist Scandinavian countries compared to the enterprise- or industry-corporatist 
Central European countries.
8
 We demonstrate that variation between the cases can be explained by 
two factors, rooted in historic differences in sectoral collective bargaining institutions. First, 
liberalization of the telecommunications industry in Germany and Denmark exposed exit routes 
from existing institutional arrangements – which we refer to as ‘institutional loopholes’ – that gave 
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employers significant opportunities to by-pass or undermine collective agreements. Equivalent 
loopholes were not available to firms in Austria and Sweden. Second, historic union structures in 
lead firms and at sector level in Sweden and Austria were more supportive of inter-union 
cooperation within the new telecommunications sector and across networked workplaces, while 
those in Denmark and Germany encouraged substantial inter-union competition. These factors were 
interrelated through positive or negative feedback loops. The presence of institutional loopholes 
further undermined the potential for union cooperation, whereas bargaining structures promoting 
union cooperation played a role in preventing the expansion of loopholes.  
 
Our findings contribute to broader debates on the relationship between institutions, actor strategies, 
and changing patterns of labor market inequality. First, we demonstrate that the distinctive 
characteristics of sector-level industrial relations within a major service industry can lead to 
outcomes that are poorly predicted by the dominant theoretical frameworks in comparative political 
economy. This includes the VoC literature on national models of industrial relations
9
 as well as 
recent scholarship in this tradition focusing on the role of national-level coalitions in labor market 
reforms.
10
 An alternative body of research in industrial relations and the sociology of work has 
drawn attention to sub-national processes of institutional change,
11
 including several studies 
focusing on the telecommunications industry.
12
 However, findings from these studies are either 
broadly consistent with outcomes predicted by the literature on national models, or they reflect 
heterogeneous combinations of causal variables that are difficult to generalize. The context-specific 
character of these findings may be one reason why these scholars’ critique of the macro-level focus 
of most comparative political economy scholarship has largely been ignored within the wider 
literature. Our research design, based on two sets of matched pair case studies in a rapidly 
liberalizing service industry, allows us to demonstrate that distinctive institutional legacies at the 
sector level can lead to surprising patterns of institutional change where a range of contextual 
factors are very similar.  
 
Second, we map out the mechanisms at sector level that contributed to these different sub-national 
trajectories of institutional change. Past studies have argued that factors such as institutional 
loopholes, union density, and the strength of collective voice institutions influence employers’ 
ability to differentiate pay and conditions across networked workplaces.
13
 We show that employers’ 
restructuring strategies can not only affect patterns of inequality in the short term, but also have 
persistent effects on worker representatives’ power resources as they seek to develop a coordinated 
response to these measures. Accordingly, the political capacity of employers to segment pay and 
working conditions and the power resources that unions are able to mobilize to contest these 
strategies are closely linked and mutually reinforcing. This suggests that it is necessary to analyze 
both together to explain different trajectories of institutional change.  
 
The article is organized as follows. We first provide background on our four case studies and 
describe differences in the outcome we seek to explain: the degree of centralization and 
coordination in the collective bargaining institutions that were established in the 
telecommunications industries of each country between the late 1990s and 2010s. We then review 
past research that has sought to explain variation in trajectories of institutional change in 
coordinated economies. In the third section, we return to the cases to demonstrate the parallel ways 
in which prior institutions influenced trajectories of institutional change. The final section 
summarizes our findings, and discusses the broader contribution to debates in the literature. Our 
analysis is based on company publications and 76 semi-structured interviews with union 
representatives and employers at sectoral and at workplace level, which we conducted by phone and 
face-to-face in the four countries between 2010 and 2015. 
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Common challenges and divergent outcomes in national telecommunications 
industries 
 
Prior to the 1990s, state-owned Public Telecommunications Operators (PTOs) held monopolies or 
near-monopolies on telecommunications services in the four countries included in our study. These 
included Telekom Austria (later A1) in Austria; Televerket (later Telia and then TeliaSonera) in 
Sweden; Deutsche Telekom in Germany; and Tele Danmark (later TDC) in Denmark. Competition 
in national telecommunications markets was encouraged by the development of competing 
technologies, such as mobile networks and the internet, and by regulatory changes aimed at giving 
competitors access to the incumbent monopolists’ fixed networks. National governments ended 
monopolies on telecommunications network infrastructure and voice telephony by 1998 to comply 
with an EU directive. Denmark, Austria, and Germany introduced similar legislation complying 
with this directive between 1996 and 1998, while Sweden liberalized telecommunications 
significantly earlier, between the mid-1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Following liberalization, each incumbent’s share of the fixed-line market in its respective country 
declined, although with some variation: TDC’s market share was the most stable, remaining at close 
to 70% of the fixed-line traffic volume between the late 1990s and 2013, while A1 experienced the 
steepest reduction, falling from over 80% to 46% in the same period.
14
 This decline was 
exacerbated by shrinking revenues in this segment in all four companies, which they compensated 
for somewhat by retaining high (40-70%) market share in expanding mobile and broadband market 
segments.
15
 The incumbents also shifted from public or state ownership to partial or full private 
ownership over this period. TDC is fully privatized; TeliaSonera has the highest state ownership 
(51%); while A1 and Deutsche Telekom have close to 30% state ownership.  
 
Incumbent firms subsequently came under pressure in the late 1990s and 2000s to reduce costs and 
develop new strategies to attract and retain customers. Downsizing and outsourcing led to massive 
shedding of staff, with reductions of between 35% (Deutsche Telekom) and 73% (TeliaSonera) 
between 2000 and 2010.
16
 At the same time, each company continues to represent close to half of 
telecommunications employment in their respective countries, or up to 70% in the case of Deutsche 
Telekom.
17
 
 
These developments challenged established collective bargaining structures. Traditionally, one or 
several major unions were responsible for negotiating with the incumbent firm. Moreover, in the 
countries compared here, there were special bargaining arrangements for civil servants, who made 
up a majority of the incumbents’ workforce prior to privatization. As new competitors entered the 
industry, a collective bargaining structure that had been based on a combination of public sector 
bargaining, legislated pay and conditions for civil servants, and enterprise-level agreements had to 
be adjusted to a more diverse private sector industry, made up of a growing proportion of small 
firms and foreign-owned competitors. These new entrants often had diverging interests from the 
incumbent firms, which sought to protect their markets and limit competition. Often by extension, 
the new competitors’ employees were reluctant to join the union or unions representing the 
incumbent’s workforce. These new companies also tended to employ younger workers who were 
less likely to be union members than the older, civil servant-dominated workforce of the incumbent 
firms.  
In addition, incumbent firms established or purchased subsidiaries in order to expand into new 
market segments. These subsidiaries typically had lower union density and newer collective 
bargaining institutions, leading to increasingly heterogeneous union representation across each 
corporate group. Unions thus faced the challenges of maintaining and extending the generous terms 
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and conditions of historic collective agreements with incumbent firms, while establishing new 
institutions for an increasingly diverse and competitive telecommunications sector.  
Despite these similarities, collective bargaining institutions developed along two distinct 
trajectories. Centralized and coordinated collective agreements were established in Austria and 
Sweden, while bargaining became increasingly decentralized and disorganized in Germany and 
Denmark.  
In Austria and Sweden, encompassing collective bargaining institutions were extended to new 
entrants and across each incumbent’s major subsidiaries. In Austria, the Union of Post and 
Telecommunications Employees (GPF) continued to represent employees at A1, while the Union of 
Salaried Employees (GPA) organized employees in new market entrants. In December 1997, both 
unions concluded the first collective agreement with the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber 
(WKÖ), which established terms and conditions for new private telecommunications companies. 
This agreement did not cover A1, which negotiated a separate collective agreement with the GPF. 
However, the two agreements were closely coordinated, with nearly identical pay scales for similar 
jobs. Together, these two collective agreements covered 100% of firms and of the workforce in the 
telecommunications industry. In addition, within A1 bargaining remained centralized, with terms 
and conditions automatically extended to subsidiaries.  
In Sweden, TeliaSonera’s workforce was represented by two major unions, the Swedish Union for 
Service and Communications Employees (SEKO) and Unionen, as well as several smaller unions in 
the academics and professionals confederation SACO. These unions also represented employees at 
new competitors. Both unions signed an agreement with TeliaSonera at the corporate group level 
and a sectoral agreement with the employers association Almega IT Employers. Within 
TeliaSonera, local agreements on pay were closely coordinated and could not derogate from the 
terms of the sectoral and corporate group agreements. According to union officials, the sectoral 
agreement covered 86% of firms and 88% of employees in the industry in 2011. Moreover, 
telecommunications firms that were not members of the employers association typically applied the 
same basic terms and conditions from the collective agreement.  
In contrast, collective bargaining in Germany and Denmark became increasingly decentralized and 
disorganized at industry level and across incumbent firms’ subsidiaries. In Germany, Deutsche 
Telekom’s employees were initially represented by the German Postal Union (DPG). The DPG 
merged with four other service unions in 2001 to form ver.di, which continued to negotiate 
collective agreements with Deutsche Telekom. By 2010, there were an estimated 80 separate 
agreements across the corporate group that were poorly coordinated, with widely varying wage 
scales and terms and conditions at subsidiary level. In addition, a sectoral collective agreement was 
never established for the German telecommunications industry. Some new industry entrants 
negotiated company-level agreements with other unions, including IG Metall, Transnet, ötv, and IG 
BCE. However, most small firms (and some larger firms) in the new industry did not negotiate 
collective agreements. In 2009, an estimated 80 percent of the telecommunications workforce was 
covered by company-level collective agreements.
18
 However, these agreements varied substantially, 
with no coordination of pay scales or terms and conditions across firms. 
In Denmark, TDC’s employees were represented by the Telecommunications Association (TKF) 
union, which merged with the Danish Metalworkers (Dansk Metal) in 2003. Employees in most 
new telecommunications entrants were represented by the Union of Commercial and Clerical 
Employees (HK), although some smaller unions were also present in the industry. There were two 
competing employers’ associations for the telecommunications industry, the Confederation of 
Danish Industries (DI) and the Danish Chamber of Commerce (DE), both of which negotiated 
separate sectoral agreements. TDC was a member of DI, and applied the basic terms of its white-
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collar agreement. However, Dansk Metal negotiated separate company-level agreements at the TDC 
corporate group level and across its subsidiaries, which were allowed to derogate from levels in the 
company’s historic, core business units. Union officials estimated that collective agreements 
covered around 60 percent of the telecommunications workforce in 2012. Many small firms did not 
negotiate agreements, and pay and terms and conditions differed substantially at company level.  
 
A related concern is the degree to which collective bargaining institutions were encompassing for 
employees in externalized jobs. Telecommunications firms in all countries shifted some proportion 
of their work during the late 1990s and 2000s to subcontractors or staffing agencies, which could be 
covered by different (or no) collective bargaining arrangements. Services such as call center, 
technician, and IT support jobs were most affected by subcontracting. In Austria and in Sweden, 
sectoral collective agreements setting base pay and conditions covered a large proportion of staffing 
agencies and subcontractors. Additionally, company agreements at A1 and TeliaSonera ensured that 
agency workers had similar pay and conditions to in-house staff. In Germany and Denmark, a 
majority of subcontractors handling work in the telecommunications sector were not covered by 
collective agreements, or were covered by weaker company agreements with much lower pay and 
conditions compared to incumbent firms. Deutsche Telekom did have company agreements 
requiring equal pay and conditions for agency workers. However, agency workers at TDC were 
paid according to a separate sectoral agreement and some company-level agreements negotiated by 
the larger agencies, which allowed lower pay relative to permanent staff.
19
 
The encompassing collective bargaining institutions in Austria and Sweden led to more 
homogenous and compressed wages in the telecommunications sector and between similar internal 
and subcontracted jobs compared to those in Germany and Denmark. This appears to have been 
coupled with a higher degree of wage restraint in the incumbent firms in Austria and Sweden. For 
example, pay for call center agents at TDC ranged from a starting salary of 1,589€/month at a 
dedicated call center subsidiary to a top salary of 2,607€/month for employees serving large 
business customers, with a range of salaries in different business units serving distinct customer 
segments.
20
 Field technicians’ salaries were similarly spread between 2,343€ and 2,804€/month. In 
addition, both TDC’s competitors and subcontractors in Denmark paid significantly lower rates in 
both areas of work.  
In contrast, at TeliaSonera, call center agents received between 1,350€ and 1,792€/month across 
customer segments, with no systematic differentiation between subsidiaries or for employees 
serving different customer segments.
21
 This basic pay structure was applied across similar jobs in 
the telecommunications sector. All technicians working for TeliaSonera were employed by 
subcontractors, but salaries had not changed following outsourcing, and ranged from 1,542€ to 
2,333€/month. We observed a similar pattern of variation in the German and Austrian cases, with 
more compressed wages in Austria across job and industry segments, coupled with more significant 
wage restraint at the upper end compared to Germany. 
 
 
Explaining outcomes  
 
To explain these contrasting patterns of outcomes across the cases, we employ a research design 
that combines ‘most-similar’ and ‘most-different’ systems comparisons. This permits controlling 
for some explanatory factors, while identifying systematic patterns across cases. Most-similar 
systems designs compare very similar cases that differ with respect to only few explanatory factors 
but have contrasting outcomes. In brief, most-similar comparison ‘assumes that the factors that are 
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common to relatively homogeneous countries are irrelevant in explaining their differences.’22 
Conversely, most-different systems designs compare different cases with a similar outcome but 
with few explanatory variables in common.
23
 The logic of most-different system designs is that 
those factors that differ between countries cannot explain a common outcome. Here, we examine 
two sets of ‘most similar’ cases that show different outcomes within each case pair. 
 
Our study is distinctive in examining matched company- and sector-level cases nested within 
countries. Some possible explanations of diverging outcomes at company- and sector-level – such 
as the timing and substance of market liberalization, levels of competition, or pressures to cut costs 
and increase ‘shareholder value’ – are similar across all cases. Those factors that do differ appear to 
cross-cut outcomes. For example, Sweden liberalized its telecommunications market earliest and 
TeliaSonera downsized most significantly, outsourcing all of its technician services; while A1 in 
Austria experienced the most dramatic drop in market share of the companies. We might expect 
these factors to be associated with strong cost-based pressures to restructure work and aggressive 
union avoidance strategies by employers. Nonetheless, both firms established encompassing 
collective bargaining institutions in the period after liberalization. In another example, the Austrian 
and German telecommunications markets liberalized around the same time, while A1 and Deutsche 
Telekom had similar proportions of state ownership, as well as a similarly steep decline in average 
return on assets between the late 1990s and mid-2000s. However, these two cases have diverging 
outcomes, with enhanced coordination in Austria and increasing disorganization in Germany. 
 
Our case selection also allows us to hold constant national-level variables that the comparative 
political economy literature argues explain variation in both actor strategies and trajectories of 
institutional change. All four countries are considered coordinated market economies (CME), 
characterized by strong unions and corporatist industrial relations traditions. The VoC literature 
assumes that private service industries in coordinated economies benefitted from positive spillover 
effects of encompassing bargaining institutions in manufacturing.
 24
 The dualism literature similarly 
points to the dependence of service industries on the strategies of manufacturing employers and 
unions, but argues that these strategies have led to increased deregulation of service industries and 
jobs as core workers have sought to preserve their privileged status in the face of increased 
pressures to reduce labor costs.
25
 Conversely, our case studies show distinctive dynamics of 
bargaining centralization or disorganization within a large service industry across major coordinated 
economies. In Austria and Sweden, new, encompassing institutions were built that established 
similar pay structures and working conditions across telecommunications firms and between core 
and peripheral worker groups.  
 
Other possible sources of variation could be systematic differences in models of coordination within 
CMEs, with a contrast typically drawn between ‘macrocorporatist’ Scandinavian and ‘industry-’ or 
‘enterprise-corporatist’ Central European countries.26 Previous research explained diverging 
trajectories of institutional change in these two groups of countries through differences in the role of 
peak-level service industry actors in national coalitions, and in the role of the state as employer in 
different welfare state models.
27
 However, the outcomes we observe cross-cut these models: the 
telecommunications sectors in both Denmark and Germany experienced similar trends of 
bargaining disorganization, associated with growing inequality and downward pressure on pay and 
conditions for the employees of incumbent firms.  
 
Thus, the different patterns of institutional disintegration or institution building that we observe at 
sector-level do not easily map onto the analytical categories developed in the VoC literature to 
explain different patterns of institutional change at the national level. To explain these differences, 
it is necessary to compare the changing political dynamics of collective bargaining within each 
country’s telecommunications industry. The process of constructing new sectoral institutions in this 
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industry was influenced by national labor market and industrial relations institutions. However, they 
took distinctive forms as employers and unions sought to adapt to the changing competitive 
conditions brought about by market liberalization and to build new bargaining structures that 
extended negotiated protections to new firms and worker groups.  
 
Our argument has two components. The first concerns the role of employer strategies in driving the 
liberalization of protective institutions. Past research has shown that employer strategies can take 
the form of open challenges to collective bargaining arrangements, or result in more gradual 
changes as employers ‘test new behavior inside of old institutions.’28 Manufacturing employers in 
Germany have been found to publicly lobby for bargaining decentralization and to leave the 
employers’ association.29 Other studies have examined the actions of employers in undermining 
bargaining institutions from within. For example, Shire et al. found that call centers in several 
European countries used specific forms of temporary contracts to avoid sectoral collective 
agreements, contributing to the fragmentation of bargaining coverage.
30
 Similarly, Jaehrling and 
Méhaut argue that German and French service employers exploited distinctive gaps in labor market 
regulations and union enforcement to pursue similar segmentation strategies.
31
 This line of analysis 
focuses on the agency of employers in by-passing institutional constraints in context-specific ways, 
with some studies arguing that these actions themselves can have disorganizing effects on formal 
institutions.32 It provides fewer insights into the conditions under which more encompassing 
institutions can be built or maintained, with unions typically assumed to be largely passive or 
ineffective.  
 
This leads to the second component of our argument, which addresses organized labor’s capacity to 
extend encompassing and coordinated collective bargaining institutions. This capacity has broadly 
been found to be influenced by past collective bargaining structures. One set of arguments holds 
that the degree of centralization in unions’ decision-making and bargaining structures affects 
outcomes via their effect on union strategy. First, unions with more centralized decision-making 
structures have been shown to adopt strategies that incorporate more diverse worker interests.
33
 For 
instance, Oliver argues that the centralized, confederal structure of the Italian labor movement 
contributes to keeping the wage structure more compressed than in the Swedish system, where there 
are separate blue-collar and white-collar union confederations.
34
 Second, more centralized (or 
centrally coordinated) bargaining structures – such as those in Scandinavian countries – have been 
associated with solidaristic bargaining strategies, in which higher skilled worker groups accept 
wage levelling in the interests of increasing the pay of groups with weaker labor market power. A 
related observation is that decentralization of these institutions may lead unions to focus on the 
particularistic interests of their core members. Where labor has strong bargaining rights at 
company-level but sectoral bargaining is weak(ening), scholars have found high segmentation of 
wages and working conditions. This trend is often attributed to the ‘enterprise egoism’ of company-
level representatives who enter a coalition of interests with the company management at the 
expense of the peripheral, low wage workforce.
35
  
 
These analyses share the view that union capacity to extend bargaining is largely a question of their 
strategies, which, in turn, are rooted in past bargaining or union structures. However, this leads to a 
circular argument: encompassing bargaining structures lead to more inclusive strategies, which in 
turn lead to more encompassing bargaining outcomes. This raises the question of why differences in 
centralization and coordination develop, and under what conditions these are undermined or 
sustained.  
 
It is here that the connection to arguments concerning employer strategies is useful. Research has 
shown that employers use restructuring measures such as subsidiary creation or outsourcing in order 
to avoid institutional protections and to decentralize bargaining. Unions’ capacity to maintain or 
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establish encompassing bargaining depends not only on their willingness to represent the interests 
of diverse worker groups, but also on their success in mobilizing heterogeneous forms of bargaining 
power to block or reverse these employer strategies. One form of bargaining power is based on state 
support, through extending collective agreements at sector level, permitting various forms of 
industrial action (such as sympathy strikes), and maintaining legislated protections in firms and 
workplaces where unions are weaker.
36
 However, countervailing power also depends on unions’ 
success in cooperating with each other to counter employer strategies that play different groups of 
workers, or unions representing these groups, off of one another.
37
 An important feature of union 
and bargaining structures is thus not only how they affect union strategies toward different groups 
of core and peripheral workers, but also the extent to which these structures promote inter-union 
cooperation. This cooperation is an important power resource for sustaining or extending 
encompassing collective agreements. A related implication concerns the relative power resources 
employers have as they seek to reduce costs in the face of union resistance. Employers are more 
likely to succeed in differentiating pay and conditions through strategies relying on institutional 
‘escape and avoidance’ whenever labor is less unified. 
 
This discussion suggests that it is useful to examine how prior institutions affect both employers’ 
capacity to undermine or escape collective bargaining, and unions’ capacity to develop coordinated 
strategies aimed at enforcing and extending collective bargaining institutions. Our research setting 
permits analyzing how and why these factors changed over time, as well as the interaction between 
them, in an industry where bargaining structures changed quickly.  
 
Austria and Sweden: the ‘virtuous circle’ of few loopholes and labor cooperation 
 
In Austria and Sweden, encompassing collective bargaining institutions were established both at 
sectoral level and at corporate group level within incumbent firms. This was possible due to prior 
institutions that limited employers’ ability to exit agreements or decentralize bargaining and that 
created a strong platform for inter-union cooperation. In each case, we can observe a positive 
feedback loop between these two factors: encompassing institutions provided a platform for labor 
cooperation, which in turn enabled unions to maintain more encompassing and solidaristic 
bargaining structures in the face of ongoing pressure for decentralization.  
 
Austria. Austria is distinctive among our cases in having legal extension of collective agreements 
via mandatory membership in the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (WKÖ). This mechanism 
was crucial to the establishment of a sectoral bargaining structure following liberalization. Initially, 
several different sections within the WKÖ had responsibility for distinct segments of the industry. 
However, these were reorganized into a telecommunications section by the late 2000s. The section 
negotiated a sectoral agreement with the incumbent’s union GPF and the service union GPA. 
Unusual in Austria, this agreement did not cover Telekom Austria/A1, which continued to negotiate 
a separate agreement with the GPF under the terms of legislation that transformed the incumbent 
into a private-law company.
38
 Still, these two collective agreements were closely coordinated and 
established a nearly identical pay structure for similar job categories.  
 
This high degree of coordination was possible because of strong union cooperation based on a clear 
division of responsibility. As new competitors entered the market, the GPA initially competed with 
the Commerce and Transport Union (GHTV), as both unions attempted to organize and represent 
employees at new competitor firms. After lobbying the works councils of these firms, the GPA 
succeeded in establishing itself as the major union responsible for the sector. Traxler attributes the 
GPA’s success to its stronger ‘bargaining capacities’ as the largest member of the central 
confederation (ÖGB) that had become a major ‘pattern setter’ in collective bargaining across a 
range of industries.
39
 Meanwhile, the GPF confined its activities to A1.  
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The combination of encompassing collective bargaining and inter-union cooperation also 
constrained opportunities for employers to externalize work. Within A1, agency workers were 
widely used to introduce greater flexibility in hiring and firing, as the permanent workforce enjoyed 
strong job security due to the large number of civil servants. However, agency employees were 
covered by equal pay terms in line with national law and collective bargaining by the GPA. Many 
services that telecommunications firms subcontracted were in GPA represented industries, which 
also ensured their coverage through existing bargaining structures. For example, call center 
subcontractors were incorporated into the ‘miscellaneous business services’ agreement in the late 
1990s. This established a parallel structure of wage increases across networked sectors in line with 
productivity growth.
40
  
 
This collective bargaining system was not free of loopholes. Service employers in Austria began to 
make extensive use of a special category of freelance contracts to introduce more varied terms and 
conditions. Employees on these contracts were considered self-employed and thus not covered by 
collective agreements.
41
 The GPA placed a high priority on closing this loophole, and had the 
capacity to do so as it was the major union responsible for ‘nearly all private sector white-collar 
employees.’42 The union set up the interest grouping work@flex in the early 2000s to represent 
freelance workers and other employees on ‘atypical’ contracts. This group had some success in 
campaigning for extending legislated employment protections to these workers. In particular, the 
GPA worked together with the regional health insurers, which began to investigate freelance 
contracts from 2005. These contracts were often exposed as false self-employed contracts, used as a 
tactic to evade social security contributions and minimum terms and conditions as defined in the 
relevant collective agreement. After the health insurers conducted nation-wide audits of these 
contracts, employers had to make retroactive social security contributions and wage payments. 
Following this, the union managed to persuade the WKÖ to give up its resistance to legislative 
change and in 2008 to amend the national insurance law, such that most freelance contracts would 
be converted into standard employment contracts. This contributed to a radical decline in use of 
freelance contracts. In call centers, according to one interviewee, ‘they practically don’t exist 
anymore. We have done away with this almost entirely. There may still be 10% where that still 
exists, but as soon as we find them, we’ll change that.’ (Interview, GPA official, 27/01/2015). 
 
Encompassing bargaining and strong inter-union cooperation were also resources for the GPF in 
preserving centralized collective bargaining at A1. The GPF and GPA negotiated a provision in 
both A1’s company agreement and the telecommunications sectoral agreements that extended their 
terms automatically to subsidiaries and spun-off subcontractors. This made it difficult to introduce 
varied terms and conditions across the production chain:  
 
We wanted to prevent a flight from the collective agreement, where there would be different 
agreements. And so, in the first or second collective agreement […] we negotiated a passage 
that the GPF also adopted, which says that collective agreements are also valid for companies 
that have been spun off and that provide services chiefly for the parent company. (Interview, 
GPA works councilor, 23/06/2014).
43
 
 
It is unclear whether the passage would withstand legal challenges.
44
 However, at the time of 
writing employers had not attempted to contest it. This has been an important institutional obstacle 
to the segmentation of pay and working conditions within large firms. 
 
Sweden  
In Sweden, there is no formal mechanism for mandatory extension of collective agreements. 
However, unions have traditionally been able to rely on different sources of bargaining power to 
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encourage employers to comply with agreements, including high membership rates and recourse to 
strikes and secondary boycotts. The structure of collective bargaining that developed in the Swedish 
telecommunications industry allowed unions to use these traditional resources to establish 
encompassing sectoral bargaining with high coverage.  
 
In 1996, the incumbent Televerket became a member of the Swedish Employers Association (SAF), 
which established a new industry association for telecommunications and IT that later became 
Almega IT and Telecom Industries. This was one of seven service industry employers associations 
working together in the ‘Almega’ organization. Thus, both the incumbent and competitor firms 
were organized in one major association, which negotiated one encompassing sectoral agreement. 
Major service subcontractors working for telecommunications firms were also either members of 
Almega IT and Telecom or members of employers’ associations affiliated to the larger Almega 
organization.  
 
Similar to Austria, encompassing bargaining in the Swedish telecommunications and subcontractor 
industries both supported and was supported by a union structure that promoted inter-union 
cooperation at both levels. The union structure appears much more fragmented than in the Austrian 
case, as several major confederations were present both within TeliaSonera and at sector level. 
TeliaSonera employees were members of SEKO in the blue-collar LO confederation, Unionen in 
the white-collar TCO confederation, and several small unions in the academics and professionals 
confederation SACO.
45
 However, each union formally represented different occupational groups, 
limiting competition for members. The unions were also accustomed to working together, as there 
had been considerable continuity in collective bargaining and union structures from the period prior 
to liberalization, with the major unions including their traditional occupational constituencies in 
new firms and industries. The presence of one sectoral agreement for telecommunications and a 
central agreement with TeliaSonera at the corporate group level provided a strong platform for 
cooperation.  
 
These unions also represented employees in other industries providing subcontracting services to 
the major telecommunications firms. IT and technician service subcontractors were incorporated 
into the IT and telecoms agreement. Call center subcontractors were members of an Almega 
association negotiating an agreement with Unionen. This structure allowed close coordination in 
negotiations of sectoral agreements, with pattern bargaining focused on similar jobs. For example, 
negotiation over the telecommunications agreement occurred in the spring, and Unionen would then 
seek to achieve similar gains (with a high degree of success) in its negotiations with call center 
subcontractors later in the year. Most staffing agencies were also covered by collective agreements, 
and union representatives in telecommunications firms typically negotiated local agreements 
requiring identical terms and conditions for these workers. Union representatives observed that shop 
stewards at major telecommunications and call center firms were able to demand that all agency 
workers be covered by collective agreements.  
 
Union representatives estimated that the agreement with Almega IT and Telecom covered 88% of 
the telecommunications workforce. Other employers typically applied the terms of the agreement – 
which included minimum pay rates for employee groups – to both attract employees and to avoid 
public scrutiny and conflict with the unions. This also gave employers an incentive to either join the 
employers association, or to negotiate company-level agreements with the major unions applying 
similar terms. Union officials noted that the threat of strikes served to maintain high bargaining 
coverage in sectors with weaker union presence, such as call center subcontractors. This, in turn, 
increased the reluctance of large firms to contract with firms that did not adhere to agreements.  
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The bigger the call centers become… they are as well demanding that they have to have 
something that is going to make the peace so there won’t be a strike. If the larger 
companies are going to start outsourcing to a call center and the call center starts up and 
they don’t have a collective agreement, it’s a gamble for the company. (Interview, 
Unionen representatives, 14/02/14) 
 
Unionen helped to organize a large strike in 2013, in a call center subcontractor that had refused to 
negotiate a collective agreement. Although the center was closed and its workers laid off, the 
campaign was viewed as a success by the union, gaining wide media attention and the intervention 
of the Swedish Minister of Industry and Trade. This subsequently became an example for other 
firms that might be tempted to avoid collective bargaining. 
 
Similar to Austria, the combination of centralized and coordinated bargaining and strong inter-
union cooperation were important resources that the unions were able to use to preserve terms and 
conditions across subsidiaries within TeliaSonera. Collective agreements remained centralized at 
the corporate group level, with some local flexibility to distribute bonuses and agreed pay increases. 
These agreements did not permit the company to alter pay and conditions of employees who were 
moved to subsidiaries, or to introduce systematic differences in subsidiaries. In addition, when 
workplaces were sold or spun off, the terms of collective agreements were typically extended, while 
the union responsible for the spun-off employees remained unchanged. For example, between 2001 
and 2007, TeliaSonera subcontracted all of its technician services and a range of business services – 
representing close to 11,000 jobs – via spin-offs of formerly internal subsidiaries. However, 
employees continued to be represented by the same union, and maintained the same salary and 
basic employment terms and conditions following the transfer, as they did not shift to a new 
sectoral agreement. Employees moved to staffing agencies were also paid the same salary as 
colleagues doing similar work.  
 
The Austrian and Swedish cases thus show similar outcomes, which can be traced to similar 
dynamics of collective bargaining despite very different sectoral bargaining and union structures. In 
both countries, encompassing bargaining was built using distinctive political resources: the system 
of mandatory membership in the federal chambers in Austria and the presence of centralized and 
encompassing employers’ associations and union structures in Sweden. These encompassing 
collective bargaining systems were largely extended to related subcontracted or externalized jobs 
and workplaces, and to the major subsidiaries of incumbent firms, over the period after 
liberalization. This was underpinned in both cases by strong inter-union cooperation: although 
several major unions represented telecommunications employees in each country, these unions 
developed a relatively clear division of responsibility and coordinated their negotiations of 
company- or sector-level agreements. This cooperation, in turn, was crucial to sustaining 
encompassing institutions in the face of the restructuring strategies of employers aimed at 
externalizing and differentiating employment contracts across firms and workplaces. 
 
 
Germany and Denmark: the vicious circle of expanding loopholes and inter-
union conflict 
 
In sharp contrast, Germany and Denmark experienced bargaining decentralization and 
disorganization within the incumbent firm, across telecommunications firms, and across internal 
and externalized jobs in the sector. Liberalization exposed a series of institutional loopholes that did 
not exist in similar form in the Austrian and Swedish cases, allowing employers to by-pass 
collective bargaining at sectoral level and decentralize bargaining at company and subsidiary level. 
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These trends were exacerbated by fragmented union structures that inhibited unions from 
cooperating to build more encompassing, coordinated institutions. 
 
Germany 
Austria and Germany share many similarities in their industrial relations systems and the structure 
of collective bargaining. In contrast to the Nordic cases, union membership in both countries is low 
at the national and sectoral level, particularly outside of large, core firms. However, unlike Austria, 
Germany lacks a straightforward mechanism for extending collective bargaining to more poorly 
organized firms and workplaces. According to the Collective Agreement Act of 1949, the Ministry 
of Labor can only extend collective agreements when the extension is applied by at least one 
bargaining party; bargaining coverage is at least 50% of the workers in the sector concerned; and 
the extension is in the public interest and supported by a special collective bargaining committee..  
 
These constitute high hurdles, and have contributed to a fragmented, largely firm-level system of 
collective agreements in ‘new’ sectors like telecommunications. Germany is distinctive among our 
cases in lacking any sectoral bargaining structure for telecommunications or related subcontracting 
industries. The absence of a sectoral collective agreement or mechanisms to extend the terms of 
company-level agreements meant that many competitor firms were able to avoid collective 
bargaining altogether – particularly small service re-sellers and internet service providers, but also 
some larger firms. For example, the major wireless competitors E-plus and Telefónica/O2 
established works councils, but union membership was low, union affiliation of the works 
councilors was fragmented, and there was no progress toward an agreement. Bargaining coverage 
was much lower in subcontractors performing work for Deutsche Telekom and its competitors. 
Only one major call center subcontractor, Walter Services, negotiated a company-level agreement 
with ver.di. However, starting pay was close to half the level for call center workers at Deutsche 
Telekom.
46
 
 
Bargaining disorganization both encouraged and was exacerbated by inter-union competition. As 
described above, Austrian unions had a clear division of labor and jointly established a coordinated 
bargaining structure. In contrast, in Germany several industry-based unions negotiated company-
level agreements with Deutsche Telekom’s newer competitors, with little or no coordination of 
terms and conditions at sector level. Many of these competitors were originally established as 
subsidiaries of larger firms based in the public, metalworking, chemical, and energy sectors – and 
thus historically had agreements with, e.g. Transnet, ötv, IG Metall, and IG BCE. The constant 
reorganization of these firms intensified conflict among unions seeking to defend or expand their 
representation domains.  
 
The major unions negotiated a formal agreement in 2000 that divided up responsibility for 
telecommunications and IT companies; however, this did not prevent conflict. For example, 
ver.di had agreed that the mobile phone company D2 Mannesmann Mobilfunk fell under IG 
Metall’s jurisdiction, as it was a subsidiary of a metal industry firm. After the British company 
Vodafone took over Mannesmann, ver.di representatives argued that they should be responsible 
for the new company. In another example, Deutsche Telekom established a strategic partnership 
with Nokia Siemens Networks that led to the transfer of 1,600 technicians in 2008. In this case IG 
Metall had agreements with Nokia, leading to some uncertainty about whether the service union 
or the metal union should have responsibility for this group. 
 
As the major service industry union in an industry-corporatist industrial relations system, ver.di can 
be compared to the GPA in Austria. Like the GPA, it represented workers across a range of service 
industries, including several connected through subcontracting relationships. However, unlike the 
GPA, ver.di included the members and union representatives from the incumbent firm, Deutsche 
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Telekom, which in Austria remained in the union GPF. Ver.di experienced legitimacy problems as 
it sought to establish itself as broadly representative of telecommunications workers because most 
of its membership was at Deutsche Telekom. In addition, different service industries were 
represented by departments that competed for resources within the union. Ver.di initiated several 
cross-department campaigns to organize across increasingly networked service industries in the 
period following the merger that formed the conglomerate union. However, many of these were 
abandoned in the face of resource scarcity and intra-union competition.
47
  
 
The most dramatic effect of this fragmented bargaining structure was to open up large differences in 
pay and conditions between Deutsche Telekom employees and those performing similar jobs at its 
competitors and its subcontractors. This encouraged a further expansion of subcontracting, as 
management could gain substantial labor cost savings by moving work to firms with weak or no 
collective bargaining institutions. In some cases, this was accomplished through spin-offs. For 
example, between 2006 and 2008, Deutsche Telekom transferred 12 call center locations, 
representing around 1,800 employees, to the subcontractors Walter Services and Arvato. As 
described above, Walter Services had a collective agreement with ver.di, but in a different 
department responsible for ‘miscellaneous services’ at a lower level; while Arvato had no collective 
agreement. The transferred employees saw their pay cut by around a third as their existing 
agreements expired. 
 
In another example, Deutsche Telekom spun off its training centers to a hotel chain. This led to the 
transfer of employees to a new collective agreement, again, in a different department within ver.di, 
with lower pay and conditions: 
 
It is the same as in other cases: as long as they are Telekom employees, they are at a relatively 
higher standard. But if you look at the industry branch ‘Hotels and restaurants’, pay is a lot 
lower there. (Interview, ver.di official, 14/8/2008) 
 
The lack of encompassing bargaining also had effects on collective bargaining coordination within 
Deutsche Telekom. The high union wage premium enjoyed by internal employees was used by 
management to argue (successfully) for a series of concessions aimed at bringing pay and 
conditions for certain groups of service employees closer to market levels.
48
 Unlike in Austria, there 
was no rule requiring subsidiaries to adhere to central collective agreements. Works councils at 
Deutsche Telekom’s subsidiaries had traditionally enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, and had 
developed a structure of separate (if coordinated) agreements in the 1990s.
49
 This was later 
exploited to further differentiate pay and conditions. Deutsche Telekom established several new 
service subsidiaries for technician and call center services in the mid- to late-2000s, which involved 
negotiating new, less favorable company-level agreements.  
 
Denmark 
Unlike Germany, Denmark developed sectoral bargaining institutions in the telecommunications 
and related subcontractor industries. Similar to Sweden, these collective agreements were not 
automatically extended, relying instead on voluntary compliance by employers. Overall, Denmark 
has maintained moderately high bargaining coverage, often attributed to common features of 
Scandinavian countries: high union density, recourse to sympathy strikes, and strong employer 
norms of voluntary compliance.
50
 However, several peculiarities of how collective bargaining 
institutions developed in telecommunications and subcontracted services, as well as in the 
incumbent firm Tele Danmark/TDC, created a range of institutional loopholes that employers 
exploited to decentralize bargaining and avoid collective agreements.  
 
First, unlike in Sweden, no unified employers association with clear responsibility for the 
 15 
telecommunications industry developed in Denmark. Tele Danmark joined the Confederation of 
Danish Industries (DI) in the mid-1990s, and applied the DI white collar agreement. However, a 
competing association, the Danish Chamber of Commerce (DE), formed out of the merger of two 
major service industry confederations in 2007 and negotiated a separate white collar agreement. 
Major telecommunications employers were typically members of one or both associations, but 
could choose which agreement to apply. Union officials observed that this led to some degree of 
shopping around by employers. 
 
A second peculiarity of collective bargaining in Denmark’s service industries was a historic 
agreement stating that when employers were members of associations negotiating white-collar 
agreements, it was necessary for unions to document that 50% of the workforce were union 
members before they were able to apply the collective agreement to that employer. Unions could 
not strike or picket service employers who were members of the major employers’ associations 
until they passed this membership threshold. Recruiting members above the 50% threshold was 
often challenging due to Denmark’s weak legislated and negotiated employment protections. Union 
officials observed that employers engaged in illegal labor practices in service firms, such as firing 
union activists or not renewing their contracts to undermine union organizing. However, a HK 
official stated that the union can get a conviction only “if the employer is stupid enough to write 
down on a note: ‘I am firing you because you joined the union.’” (Interview, HK official, 26/4/12). 
 
The challenges to bargaining coordination from fragmented, decentralized bargaining structures on 
the employers’ side was exacerbated by a high degree of inter-union competition. Prior to 
liberalization, Tele Danmark’s employees were represented by TKF, a small enterprise union based 
in the former monopolist. In 2003, TKF merged with the metalworkers union, Dansk Metal. 
Primary responsibility for the telecommunications industry was taken over by the Union of 
Commercial and Clerical Employees (HK), the major white-collar union. Both Dansk Metal and 
HK were members of the union confederation LO, and adhered to an agreement whereby all 
companies in which TDC had over 50% ownership were the responsibility of Dansk Metal, while 
other telecommunications and IT companies were the responsibility of HK.  
 
Thus, similar to Germany and Austria, the incumbent’s historic union (Dansk Metal) was primarily 
responsible for the incumbent firm, with other unions negotiating with its major competitors. An 
HR Manager described how this history influenced labor-management relations at TDC:  
 
Actually, I think our unions are very […] dualistic in a way that they're extremely loyal to TDC; 
extremely loyal. But you also have to keep in mind that they are unions directed only at TDC. 
[….] So they have their life and everything in TDC. They can't be cool in the same sense and 
say: ‘this shitty company, I’ll direct my work to somebody else, union wise’. So they are part of 
the TDC, so they also fight for TDC. (Interview, TDC HR manager HQs, 23/4/12) 
 
Similar to Austria, and different from Germany, there was a clear division of responsibility between 
Dansk Metal in the incumbent firm and HK, which represented the workforce of new entrants. 
However, unlike in Austria, union cooperation remained weak. This can partly be attributed to the 
more fragmented collective bargaining structure in Denmark, which led to large differences 
between conditions in TDC’s core business units, and those in newer firms and subcontractors that 
fell under weaker agreements or did not apply collective agreements.  
 
TDC was able to exploit these differences to introduce a widely varying structure of pay and 
conditions across similar groups of employees. TDC diversified within Denmark by acquiring 
flexible start-up companies in different segments and continuing to operate them as independent 
subsidiaries. While responsibility for their workforce was shifted to Dansk Metal, the subsidiaries 
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often maintained lower pay and conditions than those in core business units. For example, TDC 
purchased the subcontractor Call Center Europe in the early 2000s and retained the terms of its 
previous agreement with HK. According to this agreement, the typical salary of a call center agent 
was almost 10% lower than at TDC and the wage structure was more compressed, as the highest 
salary level at the subsidiary was lower than at TDC. TDC also acquired a number of smaller 
service providers, which it operated as ‘no-frills’ brands. These competed to some extent with the 
TDC brand, but with a focus on lower price market segments. Most did not have collective 
agreements prior to being purchased by TDC, and continued to have low union membership and 
little involvement of Dansk Metal.  
 
Inequality between similar jobs within TDC and between TDC and its competitors gave the 
incumbent firm a stronger argument for aligning its pay and conditions with those in the poorly 
regulated external market. Similar to Deutsche Telekom, TDC management sought to use the large 
gap in labor costs between the core workforce and both subcontractors and TDC’s own service 
subsidiaries to convince union representatives to negotiate concessions. These were particularly 
targeted at call centers, where union membership density was lowest. In 2012, Dansk Metal agreed 
to a more flexible working time model and reduced terms for new workers in exchange for a two-
year commitment not to outsource these jobs. Then in 2014, management demanded further 
concessions – and when the union did not agree, the company transferred half of its call center 
workforce to the multinational subcontractor Sitel, which negotiated a company-level agreement 
with HK. As at Deutsche Telekom, this would result in a substantial reduction in pay and 
employment terms and conditions when workers were shifted onto HK’s agreement after 2016. 
 
Large differences in collective agreements generated conflicts between unions as TDC outsourced 
work. For example, between 2003 and 2008, TDC outsourced around 1,000 IT employees to 
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), a US-based subcontractor specializing in IT and business 
process outsourcing. Transferred employees remained under Dansk Metal agreements for two years, 
but were then moved to the ‘lower value’ white collar agreement with the DE employers 
association, negotiated by HK. A Dansk Metal official observed that this had contributed to 
tensions between the unions:  
 
We tried to negotiate with the union who should take them over [HK], and ask them if they 
would allow us to renew their agreement, because that would be a stronger position for the 
workers… But they were so interested in getting those 1,000 members, so it didn’t work to the 
benefit of the workers in my opinion… We tried everything, but they were not interested. 
(Interview, Dansk Metal official, 19/8/11) 
 
The origin of this lower value agreement lies in the linked challenges presented by competing 
agreements and a high degree of inter-union competition.  In 2011, CSC decided to join the DE 
employer’s association and thus shift employees from a collective agreement with the small IT 
union PROSA to a less favorable agreement for the IT industry negotiated with HK. PROSA 
challenged this in the labor courts and organized a series of strikes. However, because PROSA was 
not a member of the LO union confederation, it was not able to get support from other LO unions 
for sympathy strikes or actions. In addition, HK’s sectoral agreement had legal priority over 
PROSA’s company-level agreement. In the end, CSC moved to the DE sectoral agreement, 
allowing it to reduce pay and conditions for its workforce, which came to include TDC’s 
outsourced IT services.  
 
This example illustrates how union competition was exacerbated in the Danish telecommunications 
industry by the presence of multiple collective agreements with widely varying terms. While 
several unions were also present in the Swedish case, the structure of agreements was more 
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coherent, and the organization of these unions by occupation ensured that employees could remain 
within one union (and under its agreements) despite being shifted between employers.  
 
Thus, in Germany and Denmark, employers had more opportunities and higher incentives to switch 
between agreements or to escape collective bargaining altogether by externalizing work; while a 
coordinated union response was undermined by significant inter-union competition. It is striking 
that such similar patterns of institutional disorganization can be observed in these two cases, despite 
large differences in their industrial relations systems. While the details of each case vary, both 
experienced growing inequality and concession bargaining resulting from employer actions to 
exploit institutional loopholes and union structures that inhibited unions from cooperating to close 
those loopholes. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
In the above comparison, we have sought to establish why national telecommunications industries 
followed different trajectories of institutional change in four coordinated European economies. We 
have emphasized two major structural factors that influenced outcomes. First, differences in 
institutional loopholes affected employers’ ability to escape agreements or differentiate pay and 
conditions for similar employee groups. Austria and Sweden shared stronger legal or institutional 
mechanisms that facilitated the extension of bargaining to subsidiaries and new industry entrants. In 
Germany and Denmark, mechanisms to extend bargaining were substantially weaker due to pre-
existing institutional loopholes. Liberalization and privatization increased employer opportunities to 
exploit these loopholes to renegotiate or avoid collective agreements.  
 
Second, historic collective bargaining structures influenced developing patterns of inter-union 
cooperation or competition. In Austria and Sweden, inter-union cooperation was favored by a clear 
division of responsibility and the difficulty of moving work between different unions’ 
representation domains. In Germany and Denmark, inter-union competition was exacerbated by a 
bargaining structure in which enterprise agreements dominated and firms could easily move work 
between different collective agreements with different unions or competing departments within a 
conglomerate union.  
 
These two factors were connected in positive or negative feedback loops: prior loopholes 
exacerbated inter-union competition; while inter-union cooperation was necessary to develop 
coordinated strategies needed to close emerging loopholes. The presence of a strong and united 
labor front in Austria and Sweden prevented employers from exiting encompassing agreements, 
while inter-union competition in Germany and Denmark further undermined the possibility of 
developing new coordination or extension mechanisms.  
 
Our findings demonstrate the analytical strength of a research design based on matched pairs of 
companies and sectors nested within countries for explaining diverging trajectories of institutional 
change. The recent VoC-inspired literature on institutional change in CMEs has focused 
overwhelmingly on the politics of coalition building at the national level.
51
 This has led scholars to 
predict the relative stability of ‘macrocorporatist’ Scandinavian coordinating institutions relative to 
those in ‘industry-’ or ‘enterprise-corporatist’ Central European countries. We show that national 
level institutions can be poor predictors of outcomes at sector level. Patterns of institutional change 
in the telecommunications industry were influenced to some extent by national bargaining 
structures and legislation. However, they took distinctive forms due to the unfolding political 
dynamics of collective bargaining at the sectoral and firm levels.  
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We further argue that industry-based matched case comparison produces distinctive insights on why 
institutional change follows trajectories deviating from the expectations of the VoC literature. Past 
research has shown that employers’ segmentation strategies such as subcontracting and outsourcing 
can undermine encompassing sectoral agreements and exacerbate worker-to-worker competition.
52
 
Our argument and findings go further, showing that employers’ segmentation strategies are both 
related to and can affect unions’ capacity to cooperate to enforce and extend collective bargaining 
institutions: the strategies of employers and unions are thus not only closely linked but also 
mutually reinforcing. Historic sectoral institutions affected the trajectory of institutional change in 
two ways. First, they gave employers different opportunities to escape existing bargaining 
structures and to further fragment them. Second, they impaired or supported labor’s ability to 
develop a coordinated response to these strategies. 
  
An industry-based research focus also gives insights into the conditions under which social 
solidarity can be constructed or maintained. In her recent analysis of the different trajectories of 
change between liberal, Scandinavian, and continental political economies, Thelen argues that the 
resilience of national institutions associated with solidaristic social outcomes depends on employer 
coordination, a highly organized and united labor front, state support, and the ‘ongoing mobilization 
of support coalitions.’53 However, these structural preconditions are necessarily built through the 
actions of actors at multiple levels within a society. In our case studies, the presence of legal 
extension mechanisms, a clear division of responsibility among unions, and high union membership 
constituted contingent and shifting power resources for achieving encompassing bargaining 
arrangements. These took a different form in each country as employers and unions sought to 
variously exploit or close off loopholes permitting escape from these arrangements. 
 
The political dynamics we observe are specific to the telecommunications industry, and thus we 
would not expect identical outcomes in other sectors in these countries. For example, a recent study 
in the waste sector of Denmark and Austria shows opposite patterns to those described here, with 
Danish unions more successfully cooperating to establish encompassing institutions and close 
emerging loopholes compared to those in Austria.
54
 We have identified common mechanisms that 
can be used to analyze contingent, industry-level trajectories of institutional change. Findings 
suggest that expanding institutional disorganization will be most likely where major employers are 
able to exploit gaps in regulation to escape or decentralize bargaining; and where sectoral 
bargaining structures encourage inter-union competition. Together, these factors undermine labor’s 
relative power resources, creating a vicious cycle of intensifying worker-to-worker competition and 
declining institutional coordination that worker representatives find difficult to reverse. 
 
Critics may argue that industry developments have marginal importance, with more consequential 
action occurring at the national level. To counter this argument, it is worth returning to our case 
study that is most surprising from the perspective of this literature: Denmark. A number of studies 
have praised the Danish model, widely seen as perhaps the last successful case of social 
democracy.
55
 However, other recent literature describes cracks in this model, presenting evidence of 
growing inequality and union avoidance.
56
 Our findings suggest that these cracks may be indicative 
of more systematic weaknesses in a national system that rests on a fragile balance of power between 
labor and management within large industries and at major employers within those industries. 
Collective bargaining institutions in Denmark’s growing service industries have substantial 
loopholes that employers are willing and able to exploit, resulting in the opening up of further gaps 
in regulation. If the dynamics we observe continue, this could pose serious challenges to a system 
based on voluntary adherence to increasingly unequal collective agreements. Strengthening or 
sustaining cooperation between unions at sectoral and national level may be essential to both close 
these gaps and prevent their further expansion. 
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